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4.1The Interest in Transportation Productivity
Recently, a great deal of interest has been expressed in measuring
and improving productivity in the transportation industries. In addition
to all the conventional reasons for wishing to know more about the
productivity of any industry, an additional concern in the case of trans-
portation is that several transportation modes; notably the railroads and
urban mass transit, have been declining rapidly. Many analysts have
argued that the decline of these modes is undesirable—because, for
example, it imposes hardships on employees and certain groups of pas-
sengers and shippers who are particularly dependent on the service these
modes provide; or, more recently, because these modes appear to gen-
erate less pollution and use less energy than their competitors.
It is, of course, less than fully obvious that a high rate of productivity
growth will necessarily reverse the decline of these, or any other, indus-
tries. The evidence, though, suggests that productivity and growth are
positively related, as shown in figure 4.1. Needless to say, one can
debate cause and effect in this relationship; besides, it is not always that
close: two of the more notoriously declining or stagnant industries of
the U.S. postwar economy—railroads and coal mines—were also by
many conventional measures good productivity performers.
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Fig. 4.1 Relationship between Annual Rates of Change in Output
and in Total Factor Productivity, Thirty-Two Industry
Groups: 1948—66
Productivity improvement probably is perhaps best viewed as a help-
ful, perhaps sometimes necessary, but not a sufficient condition for an
industry to develop a favorable growth record. Certainly, productivity
improvement does help an industry to keep pace with other industries,
all else being equal. Moreover, few would argue with the proposition
that if productivity could be improved in some of the troubled transpor-
tation industries, the odds would at least improve, even if ever so
slightly, that these modes could be once again revived.
Interest in measuring and improving transportation productivity is
also generated by the circumstance that many of the transportation
industries are closely regulated and often subsidized by government.297 Measurement and Analysis of Productivity
The extensive public involvement in the industry has a variety of moti-
vations, too many to list here. But whatever the motives, regulation
often involves the government in decisions about the industry where
information on productivity is deemed vital or at least helpful. Such
decisions include the appropriate fares and rates for transportation
services, valuation of transportation capital, and compensation for labor.
It is also now apparent that a common unintended consequence of
public involvement may be the weakening of industry incentives to
improve productivity. This possibility is perhaps most pertinent where
public operating subsidies exist. Operating subsidies are common among
transit firms and local service airlines, and are being implemented for
northeastern railroads.
Even without direct subsidies, motivation for productivity improve-
ment may be undermined by public regulation. One famous example
is the ICC regulation on calculation of the cost of service in rate making.
An unintended consequence was apparently to make it unprofitable for
the railroads to use what was, under normal circumstances, the most
efficient type of fiat cars for piggyback service (Gellman 1971).
These concerns, new and old, have stimulated several recent analyses
of productivity trends in transportation industries. Several problems in
measuring productivity have been identified recurrently in these efforts.
While the problems are usually not unique to transportation, they are
perhaps particularly common and difficult in this sector. No insurmount-
able conceptual barriers may exist to finding solutions, but substantial
difficulties in the accurate measurement and analysis of productivity
trends are posed.
To illustrate these problems, we shall first describe some of the most
difficult and common of them as encountered when measuring transpor-
tation productivity. Then we will review some recent attempts to esti-
mate productivity trends in the trucking and railroad industries. Finally,
we will present some new research on the productivity record of the
urban mass transit industry from 1948 to 1970.
4.2Problems in Measuring Transportation Productivity
In essence, measuring productivity change really involves manipulat-
ing and comparing four basic quantities: (1) rate of growth of output
(Y'); rate of growth of labor inputs (L'); (3) rate of growth of capital
(K'); and (4) rate of growth of intermediate goods used (I'). Using
these four quantities, a standard formula for measuring change in what
has come to be called total factor productivity is
A' =Y'[a (L')] —[p (K')]—[(1—a—a)(I')],298John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-Ibáñez
where
A' =totalfactor productivity change;
a =the"weight" attached to the labor contribution to Out-
put (e.g., the labor exponent in a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function); and
/3 =the"weight" attached to the capital contribution to
output.
Obviously, the fundamental problems of productivity measurement are
developing acceptable measures of the four basic rates of growth and
determining the weights (e.g., a, /3, and l—a—/3) to be attached to the
different factor inputs. For a variety of reasons, these measurement and
weighting problems almost always involve a certain number of assump-
tions and judgments. However, additional difficulties can be encountered
in transportation because the sector is often of particular public interest,
which commonly leads in turn to government regulation, subsidy, and
other public involvement in the industry.
By way of illustration, a conventional method employed by govern-
ments for achieving social goals in transport is to keep rates low on
those transport activities that are deemed most essential to promoting
these objectives. Of course, if low enough, such rates may generate
losses, which if not subsidized from public funds, must be made up from
other activities conducted by the transport enterprise. One commonly
used method of recouping is to charge high rates in so-called monopoly
markets served by the carrier. Often these monopolies prove transient
or nonexistent; a temptation may then emerge for the regulators to
"remedy" the situation by artificially creating monopolies through vari-
ous restrictions, e.g., on entry or competitor's prices.
Such policies can make it difficult to derive a meaningful measure of
industry output. In most industries a single index of output is usually
calculated by using relative prices to weight different types of service
or outputs. In a market economy relative prices should reflect the rela-
tive value which customers place on these services and, where the in-
dustry is competitive, the relative cost of producing them. But when
public policies deliberately keep some prices below and some above
costs, relative prices may lose these qualities. Under these regulatory
"distortions," relative price weights may mainly reflect circumstances
that are largely irrelevant to normal output measurement, such as
changes in the policies of regulators or in the mix of subsidized and
unsubsidized outputs.
This problem is well illustrated in estimating postwar railroad pro-
ductivity growth. Railroads produced both freight and passenger ser-
vices, and the tariffs charged were heavily regulated and cross-subsi-299 Measurementand Analysis of Productivity
dized. Usually passenger tariffs were far below costs and the services
were continued only because the regulators so decreed, against the
wishes of management and often in the absence of much market de-
mand. At the same time, "monopoly" tariffs placed on freight to com-
pensate for the passenger losses were in large measure forced down by
truck or barge competition, so that rates charged for different types of
freight services increasingly tended to reflect real demand and cost
characteristics. Since passenger services declined rapidly while freight
services did not, an index of railroad output constructed with passenger
and freight outputs weighted by relative prices makes the postwar de-
cline in output look less precipitous than, in some senses, it was. Pro-
ductivity estimates based on such an output index would correspond-
ingly exaggerate the growth in railroad productivity.
Even if public transport goals are advanced without distorting relative
prices, say by direct government subsidy, a problem may remain of
properly valuing the special "outputs" thereby achieved. For example,
in recent years the transit industry has received public subsidies in order
to preserve mobility and reduce air pollution, among other goals. But
the worth of additional mobility in an urban area or for a small town
has never been assessed veryobjectively. And while some attempts have
been made to estimate the value of less polluted air, the estimates done
to date are probably best described as rough approximations (National
Academy of Sciences, Committee on the Costs and Benefits of Auto-
mobile Emission Control, 1974).
In sum, the "social" character of some transport activities may make
it difficult even to define a quantitative measure of "true" output for
the industry. Even if that problem can be finessed or ignored, the con-
ventional solution of using market prices or values to construct an
aggregate index of total output is not feasible or meaningful if prices
are highly regulated and cross-subsidization is prevalent.
This lack of good market information permeates and complicates
almost all aspects of transport productivity measurement. For example,
a pervasive, special difficulty in measuring transportation output is dif-
ferentiating between terminal and line-haul operations. Although both
operations are essential for completing most shipments, they involve
two distinct types of service, normally performed by different parts of a
transportation organization or even by different organizations. To handle
joint production problems of this type when measuring output and
productivity, two approaches are commonly used: (1) establish that
the relative proportions of the two activities are more or less constant;
or (2) "unbundle" the two activities and estimate their value or costs
separately.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the mix of these two
functions will be the same for different transport modes or has remained300 John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-Ibáñez
constant over time within a particular mode. The extent and .cost of
terminal operations (which includes local pickup and delivery of .freight
or passengers and sorting for assignment to the appropriate vehicle)
depend in the first instance on the number of shipments or passengers
handled and to a lesser extent on cubage and weight; these costs are
usually not overly sensitive to the distances traveled. The cost of line-
haul transportation, on the other hand, is dependent on the distance
moved and to a lesser extent the weight of the shipment. Obviously,
shipments come in different sizes and weights; even more pronouncedly,
passenger trip and shipment distances vary widely.
Most conventionally available physical measures of transportation
output tend to capture changes in one of these activities and not the
other. For example, if the basic measure of output is the number of
shipments or passengers, it will not reflect shifts in amounts of line-haul
services provided when these are caused by changes in the average
distance moved or the size of shipment. On the other hand, if output
is measured by the number of ton-miles transported, it will not reflect
shifts in amounts of terminal services required as caused by changes in
the number of shipments or of passengers carried.
In short, several measures of output may be needed to accurately
reflect all the relevant dimensions of transportation output. How to
combine or weight these different measures so as to create one com-
posite index of total output is usually not obvious. Of course, if separate
prices were assessed for the different services, terminal and line-haul,
then fairly conventional product value weighting schemes could be fol-
lowed. The difficulty is that in most, though not all, transportation
operations the service charge or tariff is "bundled" and a separate mar-
ket valuation for the different activities is not available. Furthermore,
even if separate charges were assessed, as they are in a few instances,
rate regulation would often mitigate their usefulness.
Measuring transportation output, as for most industries, can also be
confounded by the problem of controlling for differences in the quality
of service rendered. Important components of quality include the aver-
age speed of the journey; the frequency and convenience of scheduled
services; the reliability of estimated pickup, delivery, and travel times;
vibration; temperature variation and its control; noise levels; physical
protection against product damage; etc.
These service qualities have been changing rapidly in recent years
for many modes. The availability of new technologies, such as the jet
airplane or containerized freight, is one reason. Another has been the
rise in per capita income. With higher incomes, passengers have gener-
ally demanded faster, more convenient, and more comfortable trans-
portation service. Higher incomes have also meant an increase in the
share of traffic in highly manufactured goods relative to basic materials.301 Measurementand Analysis of Productivity
Because these highly manufactured goods are generally more valuable,
shippers have tried to reduce inventory costs by making smaller and
more frequent shipments and by using faster, more convenient, more
reliable, and less damage-prone services.
The quality of service has not increased, however, on all modes. For
example, the average quality of service provided by railroads has prob-
ably declined in recent years. Moreover, some service changes which at
first glance may appear to be clear improvements may not be unam-
biguously so in all dimensions. For example, the introduction of jet
airplanes improved service by making air travel faster, but it may have
also degraded service at some medium and lower density airports by
making operation of larger planes relatively more economical and thus
decreasing flight frequency.
If transport outputs were sold in freely competitive, unregulated mar-
kets, quality differences could be measured by simply using as output
weights the rates charged for services of different quality. Actually,
intermodal competition, in spite of attempts to suppress it through
regulation, is probably sufficient to make existing rates at least some-
what indicative of the valuations placed on some service differentials.
But the corrections so derived are probably rough approximations at
best.
Complications also arise in determining the factor inputs required
for delivering transport services. One of the more common of these
difficulties is that in many modes the firms providing the transportation
services do not own outright some of the capital they use. Some impor-
tant capital inputs (e.g., highways, airports, airways, ports, and water-
ways) conventionally are provided and owned by government. In addi-
tion, among privately owned transport firms there has been a decided
move in recent years away from outright ownership and toward various
kinds of leasing arrangements. The reasons for this shift are many, the
most important being tax advantages and the greater availability of
financing under leasing as compared with ownership (due, for example,
to better subordination of existing debt, etc.).
Unfortunately, conventional measures of capital stock or capital in-
puts, especially at an industry level, will not always accurately capture
these changes. Specifically, an implicit ownership assumption is often
made in the capital goods series so that only those capital inputs actu-
ally owned by the enterprise rendering the service will be incorporated
into the capital measures. Usually, these omissions can be corrected,
but only at the expense of doing somewhat more in-depth analysis of
the particular industry and its practices. Even then, it may be difficult
to measure with any precision the changes in these practices over time.
Probably the most difficult of these problems is evaluating highway
inputs with any accuracy. Complexities inherently arise when deter-
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mining the amount of public investment in highways that properly
should be assigned to different highway modes. Without much question,
motor carrier, bus, and transit productivity have benefited from postwar
highway investments. Furthermore, the total amount of capital employed
in these industries may have risen more rapidly than indexes based on
rolling stock alone would suggest. Thus conventional measures of the
increased capital employed in an industry might understate the actual
situation. The exact dimensions of this understatement, though, can be
very difficult to determine.
Factor inputs, once measured, must be weighted, of course, to con-
struct a productivity index. Factor weights attached to labor and capital
in productivity measures are usually determined by the national income
shares attributed to labor and property. Such weights should be reason-
ably satisfactory as long as wage and profit shares do indeed reflect
normal market influences. Clearly, though, such an assumption is at
least questionable in highly regulated industries.
Regulated transportation, for example, has generally had a relatively
poor record of profitability and accordingly relatively low weights at-
tached to capital inputs. To what extent this is due entirely to regulation
is at least debatable. To some extent, though, low profitability in sev-
eral transport industries almost surely reflects various attempts at cross-
subsidization and particularly the failure of the transport enterprises
to realize high monopoly profits needed to pay for losses on social
activities. Regulation may also diminish profitability by introducing a
long "regulatory lag" between an increase in costs and the realization
of a compensatory tariff rate increase—a particularly troublesome prob-
lem, of course, in an inflationary economy. Finally, regulation may
inhibit the ability of an enterprise to attract good managerial talent or
may divert such talent away from the pursuit of operating economies
and into legal and political problems.
Whatever the cause, the low rate of return to capital in many regu-
lated transportation industries leads some productivity analysts to assign
very low weights to capital inputs in these industries. Other analysts
argue that the weight given to capital ought to reflect the higher rate of
return in other, unregulated sectors since this higher rate represents the
social opportunity cost of transportation capital. While the proper
weights in these circumstances are not always readily obvious, it is clear
that changes in the weights can make a great deal of difference to the
calculation of total factor productivity (as shown more fully in the next
section).
4.3Recent Analyses of Trucking and Railroad Productivity
Obviously, caution would appear advisable in interpreting any single
transport industry productivity measure. Indeed, there is probably noj
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substitute for a detailed knowledge of an industry in interpreting and
understanding the various productivity measures normally available.
The usefulness of any particular series, moreover, is likely to depend
rather crucially on the application: certain measures serve certain pur-
poses rather better than others.
Moreover, rarely are productivity measures likely to be so precise
and unambiguous as to provide clear-cut quantitative guides to many
of the public and private policy decisions which productivity measures
are expected to aid. In short, rough or approximate answers may be
possible in some instances, but highly precise or definitive answers are
not.' A review of work done on different modes, as discussed below,
confirms this.
4.3.1Intercity Trucking
Several estimates of postwar productivity trends in U.S. intercity
trucking have been made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and by John
W. Kendrick; these are summarized in table 4.1. Both the BLS and
Kendrick independently estimate that while output in intercity trucking
has been growing at the rate of 6 to 8% per year in the postwar period,
labor productivity (output per man-hour) has been growing at the rate
of only about 3% per year. The BLS also estimates that among the
general freight carriers of the intercity trucking industry, postwar output
and labor productivity have been increasing by only 4.9 and 2.1% per
year, respectively, rates much lower than those for the industry as a
whole. Capital and total factor productivity'growth was not estimated
because of the lack of data on capital stocks and depreciation. Both
the BLS and Kendrick use ton-miles as the basic measure of output,
apparently corrected, at least in the case of the BLS estimates, for
changes in the composition of commodities carried.
Daryl Wyckoff has suggested that fundamental problems may be
created for these estimates because the ratio of less-than-truckload
(LTL) to full-truckload shipments, the average shipment size, and the
average length of haul have all been changing over time.2 From the
standpoint of productivity measurement, the importance of these shifts
1. As one student on the subject has summarized the situation: "At best, a
productivity measure (or a group of productivity measures) may serve as guides
to better understanding of the achievements and frustrations of the industry—they
certainly can never be taken as final truth." D. Daryl Wyckoff, "Issues of Produc-
tivity:State of the Art and Proposed Measures of Regular Common Carrier
Motor-Carrier Productivity," Traffic World, 18 December 1972.
2. D. Daryl Wyckoff, "Issues of Productivity," Traffic World, 18 September;
6 and 13 November; 18 and 25 December 1972; and 26 February 1973. D. Daryl
Wyckoff, Organizational Formality and Performance in the Motor Carrier Industry
Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974). Many of the same observations were
also made by Darwin D. Daicofe, "Analyzing Productivity Trends in Intercity
Trucking," Monthly Labor Review 97 (1974) :41—45.304 John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-IbIñez
Table 4.1 Previous Estimates of Postwar Output and Labor
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(in LTL freight, shipment size, and distance) is to create a correspond-
ing shift in the mix of terminal and line-haul services required by the
typical common carrier. For example, if the ratio of LTL and non-
truckload shipments is increasing or average shipment size and length
of haul are decreasing, then an output measure based on ton-miles
alone (even corrected for changes in commodity composition) will
almost certainly understate output growth and therefore, all else being
equal, productivity gain as well.
Such shifts may explain, in part, the disparity between the estimates of
productivity growth in the trucking industry as a whole and productivity
growth among general freight carriers. In the industry as a whole LTL
shipment tonnage declined from about 25% of total tonnage in 1950
to 12% in Over the same period the average length of haul has
increased slightly from about 235 to 264 miles.4 Ceteris paribus, such
trends decrease the amount of terminal services required relative to
line-haul services; as a result, ton-miles measures, like those used by
3. Calculated from data in Transportation Association of America, Transpor.
tation Facts and Trends, 11th ed. (Washington: Transportation Association of
America, 1974), pp. 10, 11.
4. Data for class I carriers only from the American Trucking Association,
American Trucking Trends, 1975 (Washington: American Trucking Association,
1975), p. 32.
- frf
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the BLS and Kendrick, could possibly overstate output and productiv-
ity growth in the industry as a whole.
On the other hand, general freight carriers apparently experienced
trends in shipment size different from the industry as a whole. For ex-
ample, Wyckoff argues that the ratio of LTL to non—LTL shipments
for general freight carriers increased from 1958 to To the extent
thisis true, a ton-mile metric would tend to underestimate postwar
growth in output, and thus productivity, among general freight carriers.
Wyckoff also finds that individual elements of general motor carrier
operations displayed different productivity trends over recent years. As
shown in figure 4.2, line-haul operations and maintenance both im-
proved in productivity, and handling of less-than-truckload (LTL)
shipments and the administrative costs of handling individual shipments
seem to have declined. To the extent that general freight carriers have
become increasingly involved in these slow or negative-productivity-
growth activities, their overall productivity record as measured by ton-
miles would, of course, be held back.
More generally, any productivity decline in the handling of LTL
shipments would only heighten skepticism about the adequacy of con-
ventional estimates of postwar trucking productivity growth that ab-
stract from changes in shipment size and composition. Because a
ton-mile metric may exaggerate output growth when average shipment
size and length of haul are increasing, intercity trucking output and
labor productivity may not have increased quite as rapidly as suggested
by the 8.4 to 6.0% and 3.1 to 2.7% per year estimates in table 4.1.
Similarly, because ton-miles may understate output growth when ship-
ment size is decreasing, general freight carrier output and labor produc-
tivity may have increased more rapidly than the 4.9 and 2.1% per year
estimates would indicate.
4.3.2Railroads
Railroads have always represented something of a puzzle for produc-
tivity analysts in that, to a greater extent than almost any other industry
—the only possible exception being coal mining—railroading represents
5. Wyckoff reports data from the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission which
show that the ratio of LTL to non—LTL shipments increased from 1958 to 1970.
However, according to Wyckoff's data LTL to non—LTL shipments decreased
fairly steadily from 1958 to 1964 and from 1965 to 1970; the increase between
1958 and 1970 is due almost entirely to an extremely large upward shift between
1964 and 1965. The size of this shift suggests that the 1958—64 and 1965—70 data
are not consistent and that better evidence of the trend in LTL general freight
shipments is needed. See D. Daryl Wyckoff, "Issues of Productivity: Measures of












Fig. 4.2 Comparison of Productivity of Individual Elements of
General Commodities Motor Carrier Operations
a case of an industry experiencing relatively high productivity gains
while at the same time declining, or stagnating, in terms of output
growth. This situation is aptly illustrated by referring back to figure 4.1
wherein it is shown that railroading, at least as measured by conven-
tional productivity indices, lies well off of the relationship between
percentage change in output and percentage change in productivity
during the postwar period.
It seems highly likely that this deviation may be at least partly a
result of methods used to measure railroad productivity. Specifically,
research undertaken recently by the Task Force on Railroad Productiv-
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1972.
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ity suggests that postwar productivity growth in railroads may have
been less than conventionally estimated earlier. Whereas previous esti-
mates (again by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and John Kendrick)
were in the range of 5%,thetask force estimated rail productivity
growth as probably lying somewhere between 1 and 2% (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics 1971; Kendrick 1973; Task Force on Railroad Pro-
ductivity 1973).
Some of the differences in these estimates, as might be expected, are
simply explained by the use of different concepts. The BLS focuses
exclusively on estimating labor productivity and, in contrast to Ken-
drick, did not attempt to measure total factor productivity. Since the
railroads have been substituting capital for labor rather more rapidly
than industry in general, the rate of growth for total factor productivity
in the industry is substantially less than that for labor productivity.
However, the task force's research suggests that, even if one confines
attention to labor productivity alone (which, of course, is a quite legiti-
mate and useful measure for many purposes), simple labor productivity
in the rail industry may have grown at an average rate of only 3 to 4%
per year during the postwar years, substantially lower than the 5%
estimated by the BLS. Nevertheless, even 3 to 4% is as great or greater
than the growth of labor productivity computed for the entire private
domestic economy, which is placed between 2.0 and 3.0% per year dur-
ing the postwar period (Kendrick 1973, p. 41).
But the largest part of the difference between the estimates by the
BLS and Kendrick and those by the task force stem from the differ-
ences in the measures of inputs and outputs. For example, unlike the
task force, Kendrick does not adjust his estimates of capital inputs to
count capital which is leased by the railroads. Since leasing arrange-
ments are becoming more common, especially for railroad rolling stock,
the task force estimates a higher rate of growth of capital inputs, and
thus a lower rate of growth in capital and total factor productivity, than
Kendrick.
More importantly, the Kendrick results are very sensitive to the
weights used for combining capital and labor inputs when doing the
calculations to determine total factor productivity. Kendrick follows
the usual procedures for determining weights by basing these on the
relative shares of labor and property in the national income originating
in the industry. As noted, though, the property share of capital in na-
tional income depends upon profitability, and since the rate of profit
in the highly regulated railroad industry is by most measures rather low,
the relative level of capital inputs could be understated for many pur-
poses by following this convention. Specifically, Kendrick accords to
capital inputs a weighting of roughly 0.1, while labor is weighted at 0.9;
any shift of ten percentile points in this weighting away from labor and308John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-LbIiiez I
tocapital would reduce total productivity estimates by about three-
tenths of a percentage point. For example, with a 25—75weighting,the
estimate of annual postwar total productivity growth drops by about
one-half a percentage point.
As in trucking, rail productivity estimates are commonly based on
ton-miles as the basic measure of output, and the mix of railroad traffic
has been changing. Specifically, railroads have lost much of their short-
haul, small-shipment, and high-value traffic, which generally requires
more factor input per ton to carry and which incurs more terminal
outlay per ton-mile. Thus, if one uses tonnage weighted by revenue (to
control for changes in the commodity mix) rather than ton-miles as the
major measure of output,6 another half a percentage point or so per
year of productivity growth is shaved from the standard rail estimates.
The standard productivity estimates also use relative prices, instead
of relative costs, as weights in combining the rail freight and rail pas-
senger outputs into a single index. As noted earlier, public regulators
long required that passenger service be cross-subsidized by freight ser-
vice, and thus the relative prices did not reflect the relative amounts of
resources required to produce the services or, presumably, their relative
value to society. A shift from prices to costs in weighting passenger
output explains another half a percent per year difference between the
standard and task force estimates of rail productivity growth.
Railroad productivity measures might also be usefully adjusted for
changes in the quality of services. The prevailing view among those
acquainted with the transportation industry is that the quality of rail-
road services, especially speed and service reliability, has been deterio-
rating over the postwar years, just as the conventional view is that there
has been an improvement in the quality of trucking services. Accord-
ingly, if one could develop reasonably adequate measures of service
qualities for these highly regulated industries, the probability would be
that the railroad productivity estimates would be scaled downward,
while the trucking estimates probably would be adjusted upward.
4.3.3Truck-Rail Comparisons
In sum, many alternatives have been suggested for measurement of
productivity change in the motor-carrier and railroad industry. Each
of these measures probably embodies some useful information. Clearly,
though, none of the measures in and of itself is likely to be accepted as
6. The Task Force did not actually weight tonnage by revenue to control for
the effect of systematic changes in the composition of rail freight traffic. Instead
they used the analogous procedure of deflating total freight revenues by an ICC—
computed index of rail rates which abstracts from changes in freight composition.
See Task Force on Railroad Productivity (1973).309 Measurement and Analysis of Productivity
the definitive measure of productivity change for all purposes within
the industry.
The measures are nevertheless suggestive. In particular, on the basis
of the comparisons and reviews of the various measures thus far done,
it would appear that the conventional measures of productivity, as
reported by the BLS or Kendrick, probably tend to substantially over-
estimate the general rate of productivity improvement in the railroad
industry, to slightly overestimate productivity improvement for the inter-
city trucking industry as a whole, and to underestimate productivity
improvement for general freight trucking. If true, this would make it at
least somewhat easier to explain why the motor-carrier industry has
grown so rapidly relative to rail in the postwar years since, after revision,
it may well be true that the motor-carrier industry experienced a rate
of productivity improvement comparable to that of the railroad indus-
try. In short, the seeming paradox that the growth records of these
highly competitive industries being the reverse of their productivity
records may be more a measurement aberration than a reflection of
industry reality.
4.4Productivity in Urban Mass Transit, 1948—70
Urban mass transit, probably to an even greater extent than railroad-
ing and trucking, has been an industry of intense public concern. The
productivity record of the industry has come under particular scrutiny
as the industry has drifted toward increasing governmental control and
ownership. The advent of federal operating subsidies for local transit
operations has heightened this interest since a major apparent worry,
at least as expressed by subsidy opponents, is that the subsidies may
induce "inefficiency" in the industry's use of resources. There is no
reason to believe, moreover, that measures of productivity in transit
will be any less ambiguous than those for the other transportation in-
dustries.
Transit includes four modes: motor bus, trolley bus, light rail transit
(more commonly known as streetcars or trolleys), and heavy rail transit
(such as subways). The size and character of the transit industry have
been changing rapidly since World War II. According to estimates by
the American Transit Association (since 1974 the American Public
Transit Association), the number of revenue passengers carried dropped
drastically in the postwar years. As the data in table 4.2 show, the
decline in passengers was sharpest in the years immediately following
the war for light rail transit and (after 1952) trolley bus modes.
The factor inputs consumed by the industry, as shown in table 4.3,
have also declined. The index of capital inputs is based on estimates310 John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-Ibáñez































































































































SOURCE: American Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, annual (Washington:
American Transit Association, various years).
of industry capital stocks and depreciation recently developed by Jack
Faucett Associates, Inc. Since buses, trolley buses, and streetcars use
public highways, a portion of highway costs is included in the capital
measure.7 The labor input index is calculated from American Transit
Association's (ATA) annual estimates of the industry's average em-
ployment adjusted by Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures on
changes in the average number of hours worked per week by unionized
local transit operating employees. The index on intermediate goods
7. Faucett Associates apportioned highway stock and depreciation costs among
the various highway modes according to the formulas proposed by a 1965 govern-
ment study on allocating highway costs. See Jack Faucett Associates, Capital
Stock Measures for Transportation, report no. JACKFAU—7 1—04—6, prepared
for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary (Washington:
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1974).
1
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consumed is based on ATA annual estimates of industry expenditures
for fuel and maintenance materials adjusted by BLSdataon changes
in the wholesale prices of fuels and transportation equipment. Finally,
total factor inputs are calculated by weighting the labor, capital, and
intermediate goods inputs by their relative prices in the base year, 1958.8
As the industry has declined, public ownership, which is usually
accompanied by public subsidization, has become more important and
common. Even before 1950, publicly owned firms may have carried
nearly as many passengers as privately owned firms; although most
firms were privately owned in 1950, the publicly owned firms included
the principal properties in several large metropolitan areas where the
industry's ridership is concentrated—such as New York, Chicago, Bos-
ton, and San Francisco.° By 1971 public ownership had become much
more- common, especially among large firms, and the ATA estimated
that, although publicly owned firms were still only 14% of all firms,
they carried 84% of all the revenue passengers (American Transit
Association 1972, p. 3).
Estimates of postwar productivity in the U.S. transit industry have
been previously made by Kendrick. His estimates are for privately
owned firms only. Since data on transit capital stocks were not readily
available at the time he did his work, Kendrick estimated labor pro-
ductivity and not total factor productivity. His results, shown in table
4.4, indicate that transit productivity increased at a very slow rate in
the 1940s and early 1950s and declined at an average rate of 2 to 4%
per year during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over the entire postwar
period studied, from 1948 to 1966, he estimates that transit labor pro-
ductivity declined at an average annual rate of 0.9%. This 0.9% annual
decline in transit productivity is striking when compared to Kendrick's
estimate that labor productivity in the entire private business sector
increased by 3.0% per year during the postwar period (Kendrick 1973,
p. 41).
Similar results were obtained by B. M. Deakin and T. Seward in a
study of total factor productivity for the postwar period in the British
transit and taxi industries. Their estimates, also shown in table 4.4,
indicate that transit and taxi productivity declined rapidly during the
mid 1950s and mid 1960s and was relatively stagnant in the intervening
years. Over the entire period studied, from 1954 to 1965, they report
that total factor productivity in the British taxi and transit industry
declined at an average annual rate of 1.65%.
8. The opportunity cost of capital in 1958 was assumed to be 6% per year.
Both the capital and total factor index were relatively insensitive to changing the
cost of capital to either 4 or 10% per year.
9. These four metropolitan areas alone accounted for 50 to 55%ofall transit





























































































































—3.48 —2.97 —1.63 —3.15
aCalculated from American Transit Association estimates of the industry's average
employment adjusted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics' estimates of changes in the
average number of hours worked per week by unionized local transit operating
employees. See American Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, annual (Washing-
ton: American Transit Association, various years); and U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Union Wages and Hours: Local-Transit Operating Employees, annual
(Washington: Government Printing Office, various years).
bCalculated from data in Jack Faucett Associates, Inc., Capita! Stock Measures
for Transportation, report no. JACKFAU—71—04—6, prepared for the U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Office of the Secretary (Washington: U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, 1974).
cCalculated from American Transit Association estimates of industry expenditures
on operating and maintenance materials adjusted by Bureau of Labor Statistics'
estimates of the wholesale price indices for fuels and related products (05) and
transportation equipment (14), respectively. See American Transit Association,
Table 4.3 Inputs Used by the Transit Industry, 1948—70
(1958=100.0)
'I
pTable 4.4 Previous Estimates of Postwar Productivity Trends in the




Privately Owned Firms in
the U.S. Transit Industry"
Deakin and Seward's Estimates
of Total Factor Productivity
























































"Kendrick (1973), p. 334.
bDeakin and Seward (1969), p. 227.
cCalculated from a least-squares fit of an exponential curve.
available.
Transit Fact Book; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972).
clWeighted by 1958 relative prices for capital and labor.
eCalculated from a least-squares fit of an exponential curve.314 John R. Meyer/José A. Gdmez-Ibiñez
While these pioneer attempts at measuring productivity in the transit
industry represent a remarkable effort, given the available data, they
may be misleading in some important respects, mainly because they use
revenue passengers carried or revenue passenger-miles as the basic
measure of transit output. Among other deficiencies, these two output
measures may not adequately track basic trends in the quality of service
rendered. Determining whether the quality of transit has improved or
deteriorated is difficult. Many dimensions of transit service have been
changing in the postwar period and, while quality has clearly improved
in some respects, it has declined in others.
For example, declines have occurred on many routes because the
frequency of vehicles has been reduced and service has sometimes been
completely eliminated during late evening hours or on weekends. This
reduction in service frequencies and service hours may force travelers
to wait at stops longer or to travel at less convenient times. Quality may
also be deemed to have declined because of the increases in crime on
vehicles or near stops and stations—although, obviously, it is not likely
that the responsibility for any such quality decline rests with the in-
dustry.
The quality of transit service has also increased in several ways dur-
ing the postwar period, and these gains probably outweigh the declines.
The installation of air conditioning, for example, has improved services
to passengers. A more important quality improvement has been a reduc-
tion in crowding in vehicles, allowing a higher percentage of passengers
to get a seat (often even in the peak hours); this reduction in crowding
has mainly resulted from transit officials not reducing the frequency of
service on routes as rapidly as patronage has declined.
Quality has also improved in that the average speeds at which transit
vehicles travel on a given type of route appear to have increased. This
seems true notwithstanding the fact that industry-wide average transit
vehicle speeds probably declined in the postwar period, largely because
transit patronage has increasingly been concentrated on those routes
which generally operate at slower speeds (i.e. in the cores of the larger
and more congested metropolitan areas). Conversely, ridership and
service have dropped sharply during the off-peak times and on suburban
routes where vehicle speeds are relatively high. On any given type of
route or service, however, average vehicle speeds have probably been
increasing, because of both improvements in general traffic speeds on
urban arterials and the introduction of more express services by transit
lines.
Service rendered per passenger has also improved because the aver-
age length of transit trips very probably increased in the postwar period.
The average length of intraurban work, shopping, and recreational trips
by all modes increased greatly during the postwar period as residential
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and employment locations dispersed. While time-series data on transit
passenger trip lengths alone are not generally available in the U.S., it
seems likely that transit shared in this general trend toward longer urban
journeys and, if so, passengers carried (or passenger trips) as an output
measure will understate the growth in output in recent years.
These various dimensions of quality changes are most inadequately
or not at all reflected when revenue passengers is used as the output
metric. Some are perhaps captured when revenue passenger-miles is
the output measure (as in Deakin and Seward's analysis of British taxi
and transit productivity). Revenue passenger miles will reflect changes
in average trip length as well as in the number of transit trips taken.
Unfortunately, passenger-mile data are not generally available for the
U.S. industry.
Series are available, however, on the number of vehicle-miles oper-
ated, and for some purposes it may be a more appropriate measure of
output than revenue passengers. Vehicle-miles would capture at least
some of the reduction in crowding in transit during the postwar period
as well as much or most of the increase in trip lengths. It would not
reflect, on the other hand, the deterioration in schedules, the increase
in crime, or improvements in amenities such as air conditioning.
As a comparison of tables 4.2 and 4.5shows,the number of vehicle-
miles operated on each transit mode declined much less rapidly than
the number of revenue passengers carried. The increase in vehicle-miles
operated per passenger carried may of course reflect consumer prefer-
ence or demand for longer trips and less crowding, but it may represent
other trends as well. In particular, maintaining the number of vehicle-
miles may have been perceived as important to achieving certain public
or social objectives. As widespread public regulation and subsidy of the
industry suggest, other dimensions of transit output besides passengers
carried may be important to society. Perhaps the most important of
these other dimensions is the maintenance of some "minimum" network
and schedule of transit service for the local community. A common
provision of franchises granted by local governments to private transit
firms almost always has been that the firms provide certain minimum
levels of service, even when and where service at the normal fare was
less profitable, for example during evenings and weekends or to less
densely populated parts of a city. As the fortunes of the transit industry
have declined, a key motivation for local public takeover and subsidy
of transit in many cities was concern about preserving at least some of
this service, especially services to downtown retail areas or for those
residents who do not have ready access to automobiles because they
are too old or too young to drive, physically disabled, or too poor to
own a car.Table 4.5 Millions of Vehicle-Miles






























































































































If the number of vehicle-miles declined more slowly than patronage
because of publicly mandated social policy (rather than passenger will-
ingness to pay for the retained or mandated services), then a transit
output index based on vehicle-miles alone could possibly exaggerate
the output, and its quality, rendered to passengers. Such an output index
should perhaps best be viewed as an upper bound for any estimate of
postwar growth in services provided to passengers, just as an output
index based on revenue passengers (like Kendrick's) points to a lower
bound.
For these same reasons, however, vehicle-miles might be an appro-
priate, albeit crude, index of the social outputs which transit produces
in addition to its services to passengers. Since the stability of vehicle-
mileage is a product of both passenger demands for improved services
and publicly mandated policies to maintain minimum levels of service
316John R. Meyer/José A Gómez-Jbiñez
Souxca: American Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, annual (Washington:
American Transit Association, various years).
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despite declining patronage, vehicle-miles will reflect to at least some
extent both the passenger and social outputs. It might even be an under-
estimate of the combined social and passenger services produced be-
cause it does not adjust for all of the improvements in passenger service
quality.
The degree of meaning attached to any such index depends, of course,
on whether maintaining transit vehicle-mileage provides significant pub-
lic benefits. It should be noted that some considerable doubt exists as to
whether maintaining unprofitable transit service is necessarily an effec-
tive means to advance the social objectives which proponents of transit
subsidy often claim (see, for example, Meyer, Kain, and Wohi 1965,
chap. 13; Gómez-Ibáflez 1975). Nevertheless, the fact that transit sub-
sidies are enacted by legislatures does suggest that maintenance of
transit services is deemed a public benefit by much of the electorate.
The choice between revenue passengers and vehicle-miles does make
a significant difference when estimating transit output trends. Table 4.6
shows two indexes of transit output from 1948 to 1970, one based on
passengers and the other on vehicle-miles. Output as measured by reve-
nue passengers declines at an average annual rate of 4.94% whereas
output measured in vehicle-miles declines at only 3.44% per year.
Since productivity is measured by the relation between outputs and
inputs, the choice between revenue passengers and vehicle-miles will
affect estimates of the postwar trends in transit productivity. The pro-
ductivity estimates in table 4.7 show that if output is measured in reve-
nue passengers carried, total factor productivity appears to have de-
clined at an average annual rate of 1.40% per year from 1948 to 1970.
This estimate is slightly more negative but otherwise quite comparable
to that of Kendrick for the private sector only of the industry between
1948 to 1966. However, if output is measured in vehicle-miles oper-
ated, the average annual rate of total factor productivity decline drops
by 1.29 percentage points to only 0.11%.
Moreover, if vehicle-miles are used to measure output, any produc-
tivity decline that does take place is in the years immediately after
World War II and not, as Kendrick suggests, in the late l950s and the
1960s. Indeed, with vehicle-miles as the measure, the postwar produc-
tivity record separates into two distinct periods: (1) the decade from
1948 to 1958 when total factor productivity declined at a rate of about
0.8% per year; and (2) the years from 1958 to 1968 when productiv-
ity seemingly improved at a rough rate of 0.7% annually.
When deriving these comprehensive measures of output and produc-
tivity for the entire transit industry, the outputs of the different compo-
nent modes (motor and trolley buses and light and heavy rail transit)
have been weighted by the relative prices of the modes. These prices
may or may not well reflect differences in factor inputs required or
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market values placed on the services. On the whole, in a regulated and
subsidized industry, relative costs are probably more appropriate weights
than relative prices, especially if some modes are more heavily subsi-
dized than others. As explained earlier, where public policy keeps the
price of some outputs below costs, relative costs are at least as likely
as relative prices to reflect the relative value which society places on
the outputs or the relative resources which are necessary for producing
them. Specifically, systematic subsidy of a service would suggest that
society envisages some special social goals or outputs of value (at least
equal to costs) thereby being achieved.
T
Table 4.6 Effect on Output Estimates of Using Vehicle-Miles















































































change, 1948._70a —4.42 —3.23
NOTE: The outputs of the different modes are weighted by the modes' relative
prices in 1958.
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Within the transit industry, heavy and light rail transit service tends
to be more heavily subsidized than trolley bus and, especially, motor
bus. Although the situation varied from firm to firm, in the industry as
a whole during 1958, the base year for our estimates, the revenues
collected on each mode were only about sufficient to cover operating
expenses. The two rail transit modes, though, have relatively high di-
rectly identifiable capital costs and thus may have been subsidized more
(i.e., a bigger gap is created between fares and total factor input re-
quirements for these modes). On the other hand, the trolley and the
motor bus may have been the beneficiaries of equal but disguised capital
inputs through their use of public highways. A firm determination of
the extent and incidence of subsidy to various classes of highway users
has been a matter of some contention in highway circles and would
require an analysis well beyond the scope of the present study to settle.
Jack Faucett Associates, quite heroically, attempted such an allocation
when measuring highway inputs in their transit industry capital esti-
mates. Nevertheless, the issue is probably best regarded as still open.
It would seem highly improbable, though, that any "highway subsidy"
bestowed on trolleys, and especially buses, could be substantial, given
that the highways are shared by so many modes and the costs are pro-
rated or spread over a very large volume of traffic, particularly in urban
areas. Furthermore, quite a bit of evidence suggests that urban arterials
of the type commonly used by transit are actually sources of subsidy
(via user taxation) for covering the costs of less intensively utilized
roads in rural areas (Meyer, Kain, and WohI 1965, chap. 4). On bal-
ance, therefore, it may not be too misleading to ignore the possibility
of unrecouped or unrecognized highway costs for trolley and bus, but
we admit this is a subjective judgment and debatable.
To better gauge the possibility of differential modal subsidies, table
4.8 shows estimates of average revenues and two estimates of average
costs per revenue passenger trip and per vehicle-mile on the different
modes in 1958. Two cost estimates are given because with the available
data it is difficult to know exactly how to allocate industry costs, espe-
cially capital costs, among the modes. In our view, the most reasonable
estimate assumes that heavy rail transit is responsible for most of the
rail capital costs reported by Faucett Associates. Our "less likely esti-
mate" assigns more of the capital costs to light rail transit and trolley
buses.'°
10. Unfortunately, Faucett did not make separate estimates of stocks and de-
preciation for the four basic modes but only for the bus mode and for the three
"rail" modes (heavy and light rail and trolley bus) together. For both bus and
"rail" modes Faucett made separate estimates of costs associated with equipment
and with structures and way. For years before 1968 separate estimates of capital322 John R. Meyer/José A. Gómez-Ibáñez
Because the different transit modes declined at different rates during
the postwar period, a shift from price to cost-based weights can make
a difference in estimates of postwar trends of industry output and thus
productivity. The impact, moreover, is very sensitive to the particular
cost estimates used. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show output estimates measured
in revenue passengers and vehicle-miles using three different weighting
schemes. The data show that a shift from weights based on relative
prices to weights based on what seems to be the most likely estimate
of relative costs alters the estimated postwar average annual percentage
decline in revenue passengers from 4.42 to 4.24 and the annual per-
centage decline in vehicle-miles from 3.23 to 2.43. This occurs because
the most likely estimates of relative costs strongly weight heavy rail
transit output, and heavy rail transit has not declined as rapidly as other
modes. However, the data in tables 4.9 and 4.10 also show that a shift
from price-based weights to weights based on a less likely (but not
totally indefensible) estimate of relative costs increases the estimated
annual rate of decline. The "less likely" relative cost estimates weight
light rail output more strongly than heavy rail transit output, and light
rail transit declined relatively rapidly, especially in the years immediately
after World War II.
A shift to weights based on relative costs also changes, of course, the
estimates of productivity. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show estimates of labor,
capital, and total factor productivity using weights based on relative
prices and on the more and less likely estimates of relative costs. The
data show that a shift from weights based on relative prices to weights
based on the most likely estimates of relative costs makes the trend in
transit productivity look slightly more favorable. For example, if output
stocks for the four basic modes were made by the American Transit Association
(ATA). However, the derivation of the. ATA estimates was never documented,
and they must be considered less reliable than those by Faucett. See Jack Faucett
Associates, Capital Stock Measures for Transportation and American Transit As-
sociation, "Gross Investment of the Transit Industry as of December 31, 1940—
1967, Segregated as to Mode of Service," unpublished, 1968.
For the "most likely" estimate of the relative costs of transit modes, Faucett's
estimates of "rail" capital costs (both for structures and equipment) were allo-
cated among the heavy rail, light rail, and trolley bus in proportion to the 1958
ATA estimates of the stocks of these three modes. For the "less likely" estimate
of relative costs, Faucett's estimates of "rail" structure costs were allocated among
the three modes on the basis of the number of line-miles each mode served,
assuming that a light rail line-mile and a trolley bus line-mile were only one-
fourth and one-tenth as expensive, respectively, as a heavy rail line-mile; Faucett's
estimates of "rail" equipment costs were allocated on the basis of vehicles owned,
assuming that a light rail vehicle and a trolley bus vehicle were only two-thirds
and one-sixth as expensive, respectively, as heavy rail vehicle.323 Measurement and Analysis of Productivity
Table 4.8 Indexes of Revenue and Cost per Vehicle-Mile and per
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aCalculated from data in American Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, 1959
(Washington: American Transit Association, 1959).
bSee footnote 10 for a description of the two methods of allocating capital costs
among the modes.
NOTE: These estimates of the relative costs of heavy rail, light rail, trolley bus,
and motor bus trips do not necessarily indicate the relative efficiency or effective-
ness of the four transit modes. One mode's average cost may be higher than
another's because that mode tends to provide better quality service or operates in
localities where factor prices are higher. For example, heavy rail transit costs
may be higher because this mode generally serves longer passenger trips and is
more heavily concentrated in the largest cities, where wages are higher.
is measured in revenue passengers, the shift from price-based weights
to weights based on most likely estimates of relative costs alters the
estimated average change in total factor productivity from —1.40 to
—1.21 % per year. Similarly, if output is measured in vehicle-miles,
the shift from weights based on prices to those based on most likely
costs alters the estimated average change in total factor productivity
from —0.11 to +0.63% per year. However, a shift from price-based
weights to weights based on the less likely estimates of relative costs
makes the postwar trend in productivity look much less favorable,
whether output is measured in revenue passengers or vehicle-miles.
Table 4.13 summarizes what seem to be the best estimates of the
industry's productivity trends from 1948 to 1970. In broad outline, the
postwar productivity record of the transit industry can be placed as
lying somewhere between ± I % per year. Estimates lying outside that324 JohnR. Meyer/José A. Gómez-Ibáñez
using a least-squares fit of an exponential equation.
range could be justified, though, under certain circumstances, especially
beyond the lower bound.
Exactly which estimate one might prefer within the range of ± 1 %
will depend to some considerable extent upon one's purposes and as-
sumptions. If the emphasis is upon output as reflected in market prices
paid by passengers, then a relatively negative productivity record can
be justified. On the other hand, if one chooses instead to stress the
social goals ostensibly achieved through transit operations (which seems
to be the emphasis increasingly favored by the governments which
subsidize such operations), then a more favorable productivity record
Table 4.9 Revenue Passenger Output Indexes Calculated Using
Relative Costs and Relative Prices as Weights (1958= 100.0)
Year
Weights Weights
Based on Based on
Weights Most Likely Less Likely
Based on Estimate of Estimates of

















































1948_708 —4.42 —4.24 —5.85
C
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Table 4.10 Vehicle-Mile Output Indexes Calculated Using
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1948_70a —3.23 —2.43 —4.37
"Calculated using a least-squares fit of an exponential equation.
canbe demonstrated. However, even using the most favorable estimate
(of +0.63% per year), transit's productivity record still has fallen far
short of the average annual total factor productivity increase of 2 to 3%
in the private domestic economy as a whole.
4.5Some Implications
To recapitulate, recent research suggests some dramatic changes in
the estimates of productivity trends in several transportation industries.
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NOTE: Output weighted by the most likely estimates of the relative costs of the
modes.
Given these results,itis difficult to escape the conclusion that, at
least in transportation, productivity measurement is an art in which
interpretation and understanding is enhanced by knowledge of the in-
dustry involved and, equally important, careful consideration of the
purpose for which any estimate might be used. In transportation, more-
over, it is crucial to understand the social characteristics of the output
and the effect of public involvement on prices and returns to factors,
especially capital. A particularly difficult "joint-production" problem
also complicates output and productivity measurement in most transport
undertakings, specifically the common practice of jointly providing ter-
minal and line-haul services. Difficulties are also introduced, as in many
industries, by changes in the quality of service provided and in the form
of ownership or financing employed for capital inputs. The normal
remedy for most of these complications involves weighting by market
prices. Unfortunately, in highly regulated transport industries market
data may lose much of its conventional meaning and therefore useful-
ness in such applications.
Some troublesome implications are also suggested for comparisons
made of productivity trends among a large number of industries. In
order to generate the required data series, large-scale comparative
studies must rely on simple, standard conventions for estimating the
output and input trends in each industry. These conventions generate
data series which are, at least in some narrow sense, consistent. But
given that the interpretations are so sensitive to purpose and the par-
ticular characteristics of an industry, the question arises of whether
the resulting estimates can be meaningfully compared across time and
industry sector.
By way of amelioration, it is tempting to argue that measuring pro-
ductivity in transportation is more difficult than in other sectors. We
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characteristics which complicate measurement in transportation, they
may well have their own special attributes and complications that are at
least equally confusing and obfuscating.
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